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INTRODUCTION
This appeal boils down to what are the legal rights and responsibilities for flowing
surface waters between upper and lower landowners under the facts of this case. Idaho’s wellestablished natural servitude doctrine requires a lower landowner to accept surface water
(rainfall, snowmelt, etc.) that follows the “laws of nature” and flows from upgradient lands.
Such servitudes are highly fact specific and can be impressed upon or include artificial features
such as a county roads, culverts, and ditches. The term “natural” does not mean absolutely
“undeveloped.” Importantly, lower landowners cannot block, impede, or interfere with that
servitude to the injury or damage of the upper landowner.
Contrary to the Jensens’ arguments, this appeal does not involve a claim to a “ditch
easement” in the sense of an active easement to convey water for irrigation purposes or drain off
surplus irrigation wastewater. Instead, Roberts seeks only to confirm the natural servitude for
diffused surface water that has always flowed onto the Jensens’ property, nothing more and
nothing less.
As detailed below, a natural servitude analysis hinges on the source of the water at issue,
not the character of the underlying lands. In other words, the properties involved do not have to
be “natural” or “wild” for a servitude to exist. Instead, courts look to whether the water arises
from nature like rainfall and snowmelt or something else like irrigation wastewater. Moreover,
artificial features like roads, culverts, or ditches do not sever or eviscerate a natural servitude for
surface water flowing from higher to lower lands. Instead, the specific facts of such features
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have to be evaluated in context to determine the particular rights and responsibilities of the
parties involved.
In this case, Roberts purchased her property in 2001 and enjoyed it without interference
from downstream neighbors for over a decade. Roberts acquired her property with Sunnyside
Drive, its culvert, and the ditch across Lot 35, Block 2 (the Jensen property) in place. The
Jensens purchased their property in 2010 subject to these same conditions. However, three years
later in 2013 they proceeded to fill in the existing ditch, ignoring the warnings and requests from
Roberts. The wrongful act of filling in the ditch changed the topography and historical drainage
in the area, causing flooding of Roberts’ home, barn, and corrals for the first time in 2017.
Despite these facts, the district court wrongly concluded that a natural servitude could not
exist due to the existence of Sunnyside Drive and a partially obstructed culvert. The court
misinterpreted governing precedent and erroneously granted judgment for the Jensens as a matter
of law. The court then used that decision to justify excluding relevant expert testimony
submitted in support of Roberts’ position. Evidence concerning topography, drainage, and water
surface elevation was critical to evaluating the servitude in this case. Further, the court
summarily dismissed valid nuisance and trespass claims without fully evaluating Roberts’
pleadings and the relevant cases.
At a minimum, genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and those
disputed issues of fact should be allowed to be heard at trial. Roberts respectfully requests this
Court to reverse and remand the case accordingly.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Court Should Reject
The Jensens make various

the Jensens’ Mischaracterization of the Facts.

factual assertions that are: 1) not supported

a mischaracterization of the evidence. Roberts addresses these points

by the

record; or 2)

at the outset for the

Court’s convenience.
First, the

Jensens wrongly contend there

is

no evidence “how surface water naturally
’

drained in the area without the Waste Ditch.” Respondents Brief(“Resp. Br. ”) at 2.
contrary, Larry

To

the

Bos provided the following testimony about how surface water historically

drained through the land prior to the subdivision development:

During the years that our family farmed the property, I observed Where
natural water drainage and drainage from irrigation runoff ran to the low point on
the property. That water, whether from rain and snowmelt in the spring, or waste
water from surface irrigation in the summer, always ﬂowed down to the lowest
point on the property where the culvert is now located underneath Sunnyside
Drive. From that point, the water continued t0 ﬂow southwesterly under or across
500 South Road. and then across another farm to 100 West. The water would
ultimately drain into the Snake River Canyon.
4.

R. 411 (emphasis added).
In addition, John Root, the surveyor that prepared the plat for Sunnyside Acres, also

conﬁrmed how water ﬂowed through
4.

From memory,

ditch that

is

I

am

the property at the time:

still

somewhat

familiar with the location of the waste

depicted 0n the subdivision plat which passes generally from the

northeast to the southwest through the property in the subdivision.
that the location

of the ditch

is

It is

apparent

snowmelt
boundary of the subdivision.

the natural drainage that allowed rain or

to drain through the property to the southern

R. 414 (emphasis added).
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The above testimony

is

supported by the actual topography which generally runs from

northeast to southwest and where the ditch

would follow

the natural contour of the land to drain

surface water toward the Snake River. See generally, R. 254, EX.

physics and

common

B to App.

0p. Br.

It

follows

sense that a ditch would follow the low contour of the property, and that

any bisecting road would include culverts to allow surface water

to continue to

ﬂow downhill.

Second, the Jensens wrongly contend that Roberts and her neighbors “obliterated” the
portion of the ditch crossing their respective properties. See Resp. Br. at 3.

record shows the portion of the former ditch was gone

2001. Both Roberts and her neighbor
(“Plaintiff never

Ken Crane

To

when Roberts purchased

the contrary, the

her property in

testiﬁed they did not ﬁll in the ditch. R. 507

caused any ﬁll to be deposited in the waste ditch that crosses

property”); R. 683 (“I [Roberts] have never observed the ditch

Plaintiff’ s

on the property of anyone lying

upstream or downstream of the Jensen Property being altered by ﬁlling in the ditch as the
Jensens did.”); R. 65 (“At no time afterI [Crane] purchased

placed any ﬁll in the ditch on

my property”).

Next, the Jensens erroneously claim that
restored

it

“back

my property in 2006 have I ever

when they ﬁlled in the

ditch in

2013 they

to its natural state” or to a “natural level?” Resp. Br. at 3-4, 24. This claim is

not supported by the record. Unless “natural” means different things to the Jensens in different
contexts, there

is

no evidence

t0

show what

the “natural state” 0f the property

was

prior to the

1

The Jensens’ deﬁnition 0f “natural” apparently means “pre-subdivision” Which is not necessarily “natural” 0r
Argument Part ILA. Prior t0 the subdivision, the property had been cleared and developed for
agricultural purposes as in irrigated farm. R. 410-1 1. The land did not exist in a “natural” or undeveloped state as
had been altered by prior owners to accommodate the artiﬁcial growing of crops.
“Wild.” See infra,
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The Jensens

property’s irrigated agricultural 0r subdivision development?

further falsely claim

they “did not increase the grade, gradient, elevation, or level 0f the Jensen Property.”

The record shows otherwise. Notably,

Id. at 4.

the original subdivision plat describes the depth of the

ditch as one (1) foot. R. 222; see also R. 605 (Jensens representing that the “plat speciﬁes a

ﬂ

foot-deep Waste Ditch”) (emphasis added). Further, Roberts testiﬁed: “After the Jensens ﬁlled
the ditch, the elevation of the ground just south of the culvert

was

eight (8) to ten (10) inches

higher than the top of the culvert, which has the effect of creating a

dam which prevents

the

passage of water.” R. 42. Finally, the land survey and expert report submitted by Dr. Brockway
details

how the

Jensens’ alterations changed the gradient on the property, impeding the

surface water. R. 539 (“Based

least 2.0 feet

compared

ﬂow of

on the survey, the estimated depth of ﬁll varies from zero

to the estimated ditch grade prior to the ﬁll.”)

M

(emphasis added).3

Even

a slight change in topography can have dire consequences as experienced by Roberts in 2017.

See

e.g.

Surat Farms,

LLC v.

Brule County Bd.

ofComm ’rs,

901 N.W.2d 365, 370 (SD. 2017)

(“considering the relatively ﬂat slope 0f the land in that area, any unnatural increase in elevation

caused by the drain

The

ﬂowed

2

The

inlet construction

salient fact is that the Jensens

blocked or changed

how

surface water historically

onto their property t0 the detriment 0f Roberts.

character of the land does not have to be in “a state of nature” or “undeveloped” in order for a natural

servitude t0 exist. See infra,
3

would cause the backup 0f water.”).

If the ditch

had a one

Argument

(1) foot

depth prior to the subdivision development (as depicted 0n the plat and represented
two (2) feet 0f soil 0r other ﬁll material clearly would increase the grade ﬁom

by

the Jensens), ﬁlling the ditch With

its

prior level. In other

words

Part ILA.

that action
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Finally, the Jensens argue that the

2017 ﬂooding was “unique and singular” and that the

Roberts’ property “unavoidably ﬂooded” that year. Resp. Br. at 4, 27. Again, the Jensens

misconstrue the record and the central issue in the case. Roberts and others testiﬁed about
similar

ﬂooding events

that occurred in the area prior to 2013. R. 41, 49, 65, 408.

prior events, surface water

would overtop Sunnyside Drive and then continue

the Jensens’ property. R. 707 (“water

would ﬂow over Sunnyside Drive

During those

to drain through

prior to

2013 by

4 inches in depth”) Given prior ﬂooding from precipitation and melting snow in the
not a matter of “if” but “when”

N.W.2d

it

would happen

See

again.

832, 836 (N.D. 1990) (“Wet cycles, as the

trial

e.g.

at least

area,

it

was

Lang v. Wannenberg, 455

court reasoned, are foreseeable, should

be reasonably anticipated, and will result in more runoff than in dry years”).

When the

Jensens

proceeded to ﬁll the ditch in 2013 Roberts speciﬁcally warned them of the inevitable
consequences of their actions. R. 41. The Jensens disregarded her request.4 As such, the
resulting

ﬂooding of Roberts’ home and barn was not “unavoidable”

shows the difference
42 (“The

table

in the water surface area both with

as Dr.

Brockway’s report

and without the ﬁlled in

ditch.

R. 541-

above shows that ﬂooding of structures on the Roberts property Will be a more

frequent occurrence due to the ﬁll on the Jensen property”).
In sum, the above facts are found in the record

offered

by the

Jensens.

and counter the mischaracterizations

The Court should consider the same

in regards to the

argument and

governing law identiﬁed below.

4

Mr. Jensen went so

Ms. Roberts and proclaim “he could do Whatever he wanted” with his
was not the only time Mr. Jensen yelled at Ms. Roberts. R. 49.

far to yell at

R. 41. Unfortunately, this
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The Jensens Misinterpret Idaho’s Natural Servitude Law.

II.

“Natural” Concerns the Source of the Water, not the Character of the Land.

A.

The Jensens misstate Roberts’

issue

0n appeal by arguing she

the ditch” across their property. Resp. Br. at

since the ditch feature

See

id. at

13, 20.

is

“artiﬁcial”

it

1.

They

is

claiming “an easement in

further misstate Idaho

law by claiming

“cuts off” the natural servitude that existed for decades.

Both statements are erroneous and should be corrected through

this appeal.

Roberts does not seek t0 change Idaho law or “shoehorn” an inapplicable doctrine into
this appea1.5 Resp. Br. at 12, 14.

district court’s errors

case.

There

is

the “laws of nature.”
in a “wild” or

5

and properly apply Idaho’s natural servitude doctrine

no dispute

accept surface water

Instead, Roberts respectﬁllly requests this Court correct the

that the

law 0f natural servitude burdens lower gradient landowners

ﬂowing from higher ground. As

detailed below, the doctrine stems

However, a “natural servitude” does not require

wholly “undeveloped”

The Jensens’ argument

that

to the facts in this

to

from

adj acent properties to exist

state in order for the doctrine to apply.

acknowledging the natural servitude would have “drastic impacts 0n ditch law” and
is a red herring and should be rej ected. See

create servitudes through “vast numbers 0f ditches throughout Idaho”

Resp. Br. at 14-1 5. While certain ditches throughout the State

may naturally drain

surface waters in addition t0

other water delivery functions, whether a natural servitude exists through any of those ditches

dependent upon the individual facts and has to be reviewed on a case-by-case

basis.

is

completely

If a natural servitude exists that

does not mean the landowner 0r ditch owner has no right to re-locate the ditch pursuant t0

statute,

it

just

means

that

such changes must be made in a manner that would not injure upgradient lands that enjoy the beneﬁt 0f the
servitude. The statute contemplates that very analysis: “such change must be made in such a manner as not to

impede the

ﬂow of the water therein,

or to otherwise iniure any person 0r persons using 0r interested in such ditch,

See I.C. § 42-1207 (emphasis added). The statute is not just
limited to those “using” the ditch, but also refers to any person “interested in such ditch.” Again, that analysis is a
canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit.”

highly fact dependent inquiry as t0 a particular ditch. Each case would have t0 be analyzed pursuant t0 the

and unique facts. Contrary to the Jensens’ theory, the outcome 0f this case will not create
“bright line” test that will expand the law 0r create statewide “problems” in ditch law.

particular evidence
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Whereas a

ditch feature existed

0n the Jensens’ property

for decades,

parcel of the surface drainage between the Roberts and Jensen propertiesﬁ

legal right to

change

their property in a

manner that

it

was

part

and

The Jensens had n0

interfered with the natural servitude.

Consequently, Roberts was forced t0 protect her rights and her property through this legal action.

The Jensens’ primary response argument
their claim that

Roberts has no interest in water that naturally drained to and through the feature

for decades. Resp. Br. at 12-16.

servitude doctrine to

undeveloped.” See
criteria or

centers around the former “waste ditch” and

mean

id. at

The Jensens misinterpret

the term “natural” in the natural

“without artiﬁcial intervention” or in other words “Wholly

15.

The Jensens

are essentially asking this Court to insert an additional

element into the natural servitude analysis that

is

not required by Idaho law. Contrary

to their argument, the doctrine is not so restrictive as the inquiry focuses

ﬂowing from one property
While Black’s

to another, not the character

Law Dictionary deﬁnes

of civilization; wild; untutored, and

is

on the source 0f water

of the underlying 1and.7

“natural” as “untouched

by man

the opposite 0f the word, ‘artiﬁcial’,” that

necessary element of a “natural servitude” in Idaho drainage law. See Black’s

712

(6‘11

ed. 1991).

If that

was

those lands Wholly untouched

6

Further, the ditch

was

truly the case, then a “natural servitude”

by humans

(i.e.

by inﬂuences

is

not a

Law Dictionary

would only apply to

Wilderness areas, sagebrush, grassland, forests,

from an area of approximately 282
Opening Brief(“App. 0p. BK”).

part 0f the natural servitude that drained surface water

acres, not just the Roberts property. R. 538; Ex.
7

0r

B

to Appellant’s

landowner makes changes or alterations that
The Idaho Supreme Court has conﬁrmed that an
“upper landowner cannot accumulate and release water in unnatural concentrations in such a manner as t0 increase
the damage 0n the lower landowner.” Lemhi County v. Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 414 P.3d 226, 233 (2018).
Inquiries concerning the upper property are only relevant if the upper

would involve

analysis 0fthe exception to the “civil law” rule.
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and any other wholly unaltered
state

of the underlying lands

is

lands).

As noted

in decades 0f Idaho jurisprudence, a “natural”

not required for the existence of a natural servitude for draining

surface waters.

For example, one of the

earliest cases addressing a “natural servitude” analysis in

concerned two developed irrigated farms in eastern Idaho. See Loosli

v.

Heseman, 66 Idaho 469,

162 P.2d 393 (1945). The properties did not exist in a “natural” 0r “Wild”
facts

showed

“that the parties t0 the action

Idaho

state.

Notably, the

have owned and cultivated the lands above described

since 1919” and that “the parties are farmers, engaged in the cultivation of their lands and the

growing of crops by artiﬁcial irrigation.” 66 Idaho

at

472, 474, 162 P.2d at 394-395 (emphasis

added). Fields that are artiﬁcially leveled, cultivated with harrows, irrigated, or that include

other

“human caused”
The

agricultural features are not “natural.”

district court in

way or drainage easement
66 Idaho

at

Loosli found that the upper landowner failed to establish a right of

across the lower landowner for his surplus irrigation wastewater. See

474, 162 P.2d at 394-95. In afﬁrming the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court

quoted extensively from Boynton

v.

Langley, 6 P. 437 (Nev. 1885), and highlighted the

difference between water that naturally

from

ﬂows between two

properties,

and

that

which

results

artiﬁcial irrigation:

“As

t0 the

ﬂow

0f water caused by the

fall

of rain, the melting of snow, or natural

is that When two tracts of land are
and one is lower than the other, the owner of the upper tract has an
easement in the lower land to the extent of the water naturally ﬂowing from the
upper land t0 and upon the lower tract, and that any damage that may be
occasioned to the lower land thereby is damnum absque injuria. Water seeks its
level and naturally ﬂows from a higher t0 a lower plane; hence the lower surface,

drainage of the ground, the prevailing doctrine
adj acent
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0r inferior heritage,

is

doomed by nature

or superior heritage, in this: that

and ﬂows from

it

t0 bear a servitude to the higher surface,

must receive the water that naturally

falls

on

this latter.”

Loosli, 66 Idaho at 477, 162 P.2d at 396-97 (emphasis added).

The Court went on
no “natural servitude”

to note the distinction

between the character 0f the water as

found

it

existed:

In the instant case there

is

no semblance of a deﬁnite channel and the

proof by various Witnesses, including some for appellants, shows that the
depression or swale which appellants were attempting to use to carry off their

was planted

and cultivated year by year.
It is not contended nor is there any proof that any water resulting from natural
causes ﬂowed into the depression or swale from appellants’ premises onto the
land 0f respondent.
surplus 0r waste irrigation water

Id. at

t0 crops

481, 162 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added).

The Court did not say a

“natural servitude” could not exist because both properties

were

“cultivated” or “developed” from a “Wild” 0r “natural” t0 an artiﬁcially farmed state.8 Instead,

the Court analyzed the source 0f the water t0 determine whether 0r not the upper landowner

an

interest 0r right across the

had

lower landowner’s property. Thus, contrary to the Jensens’ claim,

the term “natural” in “natural servitude” concerns the source of the water at issue, not the

developed 0r undeveloped

state

of the land.

In Loosli, the water at issue resulted from surplus irrigation, not precipitation 0r melting

snow. Thus, the upper landowner had t0 establish a prescriptive right to a drainage easement for

8

Similarly, Lemhz' County v. Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 414 P.3d 226 (2018), involved “agricultural property” or two
ranches that were both artiﬁcially irrigated and developed from their original “natural” state. 414 P.3d at 228-229

(noting the facts 0f how the ranches had converted from
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ﬂood

t0 sprinkler irrigation).
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which he was unable

his irrigation wastewater,

Roberts

is

d0 under the

t0

facts

of the case. In

not seeking t0 establish an easement t0 drain surplus irrigation water, but

seeking to prevent the Jensens from blocking the

ﬂow of “water resulting

this case,

is

instead

from natural causes.”

Since the lands in question naturally drain 282 upstream acres, a considerable amount of water

B

can pass through the Roberts and Jensen properties. See Ex.

to

App. Op. Br.; see also. R. 538-

39 (Dr. Brockway identifying estimated peak ﬂows). The fact both the Roberts and Jensen
properties

were formerly

irrigated

and then

later

developed into a subdivision does not change

the analysis 0f a natural servitude.9

Further, the Idaho

the water

ﬂowing

to or

Supreme Court

between two properties. See Dayley

P.2d 1073 (1974). The focus
the

two

properties.

later clariﬁed that a natural servitude analysis

is

v.

concerns

City ofBurley, 96 Idaho 101, 524

the point from one property t0 another, or at the point between

The Court described

the doctrine as follows:

civil law rule (as opposed to the common enemy
which
recognizes a natural servitude 0f natural
(1 958))
drainage between adioining lands so that the lower owner must accept the
‘surface’ water which naturallv drains onto his land.

This court adheres to the

rule.

59 A.L.R.2d 421

Dayley, 96 Idaho

at 103,

524 P.2d

at

The Idaho Court of Appeals

1075 (emphasis added).

similarly described the doctrine in Smith

Grazing Ass’n, 105 Idaho 644, 671 P.2d 1107

9

The

(Ct.

v.

King Creek

App. 1983):

facts in Loosli also counter the Jensens’ claim that “[e]very case that has considered a natural servitude in

Idaho has, for more than a century, considered the existence of a natural watercourse.” Resp. Br. at 16. There was
no natural watercourse in Loosli yet the Supreme Court acknowledged the natural servitude rule set forth in Boyton.

See

also,

Hon. Donald L. Burnett

185, 189 (1984) (“In Loosli

v.

Jr.,

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

A Proposed Synthesis, 20 Idaho
Supreme Court expressly approved the ‘civil law’ rule.”).

Surface Water and Nuisance Law:

Heseman,

the

L. Rev.

11

0f surface water. An owner
of lower property must accept the burden of surface water which naturallv
drains upon the land. Conversely, the owner of higher property cannot increase

The

rule recognizes a servitude for natural drainage

this

burden by changing the natural system 0f drainage.

Smith, 105 Idaho at 646, 671 P.2d at 1109 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Idaho

Supreme Court

in

Burgess

v.

Salmon River Canal Company, 119 Idaho

299, 805 P.2d 1223 (1991), described the rule as follows:

This rule [natural servitude] requires a lower landowner to accept

th_e

surface waters that naturallv drain from the upper landowner.
Burgess, 119 Idaho

at

305, 805 P.2d at 1229 (emphasis added).

In other words, the analysis

is

concerned with a review of the water ﬂowing “from” the

upper landowner “onto” or “upon” the land of another. If water would naturally

m

ﬂow

a lower landowner’s property, that landowner has no right to block the surface

point. Here, the Jensens

blocked the

ﬂow

See Resp. Br.

at 3-4;

rej ected

at that

at the

point of the road culvert, an action they

see also R. 173. The Jensens’ actions interfered with the

established natural servitude and invoked the

squarely

ﬂow

or

of natural water “from” the Roberts’ property, or

“onto” their land by ﬁlling in the ditch, including
freely admit.

m

“common enemy doctrine,”

a premise that has been

by Idaho’s judiciary. ‘0

1°

The Jensens’ repeated reliance upon City ofBellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1036 (1908) is misplaced and
should be rejected. The issue in Daly concerned a ditch easement and Whose obligation it was to fence the ditch t0
prevent the servient landowner’s cattle from accessing and polluting the ditch. See 94 P. at 1037. While the servient

landowner grazed his cattle “in the ordinary course 0f husbandry,” he had n0 afﬁrmative duty to protect the City’s
ditch and water supply. See id. at 1038. Unlike the issue in Daly, here the Jensens ﬁlled in the ditch and interfered
with the existing natural servitude. Interfering with such a right is prohibited by law and does not constitute “natural
use and enjoyment” of one’s property, particularly when that action results in ﬂooding the upgradient landowner’s
home, barn, and corrals. R. 42.
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An Artiﬁcial Ditch Feature Does Not Cut off a Natural Servitude.

B.

Similar to the district court’s confusion With respect to Sunnyside Drive and
the Jensens mistakenly believe that since the ditch

natural servitude

servitude in a

is

between the

man—made

The Jensens

seeking a “back door t0 ditch rights.”

Roberts

is

See Resp. Br.

properties.

ditch”).

was “man-made”

Id.

at

it

its

culvert,

therefore “cut off” any

12 (“No one can have a natural

further confuse the issue

by

alleging that Roberts

Again, contrary to the Jensens’ mischaracterization,

not seeking to establish an easement or “ditch right” in the sense of actively diverting

0r discharging water onto the Jensens’ property. Roberts

is

not seeking t0 drain surplus

irrigation water off her property either. Instead, Roberts seeks to

existed for decades, as

conﬁrmed by

have

this

Court conﬁrm what

several witnesses, wherein surface water naturally

ﬂowed

from 282 acres across her property, both over and under Sunnyside Drive, to and through the
ditch feature

The

on the Jensen property.“ R. 41, 49,

fact the natural servitude included the ditch feature as

2013 does not change the

human

11

65, 408.

analysis. Idaho

it

existed for decades prior t0

law plainly allows a natural servitude

t0 include

constructed 0r “artiﬁcial” features, like a ditch 0r a road culvert, or continue across

The Jensens wrongly argue

and expands” any drainage between the Roberts and
from
decades. The ditch only received and drained water that ﬂowed

that a ditch automatically “alters

Jensen properties. See Resp. Br.

at 15-16.

The former

ditch unquestionably received natural surface water

upstream lands, including the Roberts property, for
t0 it. Otherwise, Why would a culvert exist in the road in the ﬁrst place? When the Jensens ﬁlled the ditch for the
ﬁrst time in 2013 they blocked the historic ﬂow of surface water. Roberts is not asking for the Jensen property to
“receive

more surface water than it otherwise would” (Resp. Br. at 22-23). Rather, Roberts seeks t0 have the
afﬁrmed as water had always ﬂowed to and through the property for decades so that her home will not

servitude

ﬂood

in the future.
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developed land.

A review of the following cases exposes the plain error in the Jensens’

argument. 12
First, the facts in

(191

1),

show

Teeter

v.

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District,

that a natural servitude

19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8

can include the presence of an artiﬁcial canal.

13

As

explained in Roberts’ Opening Brieﬁ the facts in Teeter concerned a natural servitude that was
bisected

by the

artiﬁcial

Ridenbaugh Canal. See 114

down various draws through the
was not a

“natural” feature, yet

P. at 8-9. Natural surface water

canal and across the respondent’s property. See

it

did not prevent the Court from conﬁrming that

the “natural servitude” that existed t0 allow surface water to drain

Similarly, the artiﬁcial county road

12

at

228-30 (“the

it

The canal

was

part 0f

properties.

and culvert in Moulton did not sever the natural

servitude that existed between the upper Moulton-Skinner

Ranch. See 414 P.3d

between the

id.

ﬂowed

installation

Ranch and

the lower Hartvigson

of culverts, the man-made ditch across

rely upon a Minnesota case in support of their “no artiﬁcial feature” requirement for natural
See Resp. Br. at 22-23. Contrary to the Jensens’ claim, Minnesota now follows the “reasonable use”
not the “civil law” rule. See Kral v. Boesch, 557 N.Wd.2d 597, 598 (1996). Regardless, the facts in

The Jensens

servitudes.
rule,

Schulenberg

v.

Zimmerman, 90 N.W. 156 (Minn. 1902)

are distinguishable. In that case, the defendants’

predecessors had deepened a natural watercourse crossing defendants’ land. See 9O N.W. at 73. The defendants
then ﬁlled the ditch “but did not raise the natural bed 0f the water course.” Id. In other words, the defendants did
not block the waterway as

it

existed in

its

original state. Here, there

the Jensen property (pre-agricultural development).

The

is

n0 evidence

to describe the original state

of

court also found the plaintiff did not take “any afﬁrmative

ﬂowing through the water course in its changed condition or that 0f his farm, or made
any improvements thereon, or asserted any right or easement in the land of the defendants by reason of the water
course thereon having been deepened.” Id. (emphasis added). Further, the court concluded “the record does not
show that the plaintiff has or will sustain any damages by reason of any acts of defendants.” Id. Unlike the plaintiff
in Schulenberg, Roberts does claim an interest or right in a natural servitude crossing the Jensen property, which
included the ditch feature that existed for decades. Further, Roberts has shown damages resulting from the Jensens’
actions in 2013. R. 42, 58, 60, 62. Although the defendants in Schulenberg did not change the natural
watercourse’s original condition, the Jensens changed the ditch feature that naturally drained surface water from the
Roberts property and the upgradient 282 acres for decades. The Jensens did not restore a “natural watercourse,”
they blocked a ditch feature that was part of the natural servitude on the property.
act With reference to the water

13

The Jensens conspicuously ignore any mention 0f Teeter
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in their

Response

Brief.
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Hartvigson Ranch.

ﬂowing

.

In that case the district court found as follows with respect to naturally

.”).

surface water between the

two ranches:

In addition to irrigation waste water, natural spring and surface water

basin also traveled through the draw.

.

.

from the

.

* * *

On May 9, 2016

the district court entered a judgment that the Hartvigson

allow drainage 0f natural surface water in the amount 0f 3.25
culverts across
that

at

amounts.”

229 (emphasis added).

district court also

authorized the Moultons to send irrigation waste water

drainage “under both an easement and natural servitude theory.”

afﬁrmed both the natural servitude

for surface water

Id.

the

14

same

that a natural servitude

down the

The Supreme Court

and the exception Which authorized the

Moulton’s to discharge additional irrigation runoff into the drainage. See

Moulton conﬁrmed

the

lands, “subject to weather events or other natural conditions

may result in larger

Moulton, 414 P.3d

The

its

Ranch

CFS through

id. at

233. Since

can exist through an artiﬁcial 0r “man-made culvert,”

principle applies to an artiﬁcial ditch under the facts of this case. 14

A Minnesota district court made similar ﬁndings in Hylen

v.

Kolbe, N0. CV-O6-675, 2008

WL 41071 15

(Minn.Dist.Ct. July 24, 2008). In that case the court found the plaintiffs had “wrongfully and unlawfully interfered

with the ancient and historical

ﬂow 0f surface

waters across Plaintiffs’ property, with the result being the surface
dammed up.” 2008
41071 15, CL #2. Just like the facts here,

waters 0n Defendants’ land have been unnaturally

WL

which had been partially abandoned over time, but
which followed the “ancient and natural course 0f drainage 0f surface waters from Defendant’s Brown County
property into, and upon and across Plaintiffs’ Brown County Property.” Id., FF#8, 9. The plaintiffs ﬁlled in the
ditch which formed “an unnatural dike in the bull ditch area at Defendants’ property line, blocking the ancient and
natural ﬂow of surface waters through the bull ditch.” Id., FF#13(a). The court concluded that the ditch did not cut
off the natural servitude but instead had been wrongfully ﬁlled by the plaintiffs. The Court should apply a similar
the plaintiffs

had ﬁlled

in a ditch (referred to as the “bull ditch”),

reasoning t0 the Jensens’ actions in this case.
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Moreover, contrary t0 the
that the existence

district court’s

reasoning in this case, Moulton plainly shows

of a county road (Sunnyside Drive) and

its

culvert are not proper bases to

deny

a natural servitude between the Roberts and Jensen properties. R. 707.
Finally, the facts in Smith

v.

servitude can continue to exist even

that case the lower

King Creek Grazing Ass ’n support

when the

underlying property

is

the premise that a natural

altered or developed.

15

landowners (Smiths) developed their property into a farm. See 105 Idaho

In

at

646, 671 P.2d at 1109. In so developing their property the Smiths “destroyed the natural channel

by farming across
property

(i.e.

it.” Id.

(emphasis added). Despite this artiﬁcial or “man-made” change to the

creating irrigated ﬁelds over a prior natural channel), the Idaho Court of Appeals

concluded that a natural servitude

“Under the general

‘ciVil

still

existed to drain surface

law’ rule, the Smiths’ farm

is

ﬂow from upgradient lands:

subject t0 a servitude for the natural

drainage 0f water.” Smith, 105 Idaho at 647, 671 P.2d at 1110 (emphasis added). The Court of

Appeals further found that King Creek was entitled to exercise the natural servitude exception as
well because the altered

ﬂow from the

developed spring would have

ﬂowed within the

of the former natural channel across the Smiths’ developed property. See
671 P.2d

15

The

id.,

capacity

105 Idaho

at

648,

at 1111.

facts in Looslz'

v.

Heseman

also concerned

two developed

irrigated farms.

See 66 Idaho

at

472, 162 P.2d at

394. The Supreme Court approved the natural servitude rule but acknowledged the water at issue did not result

“from natural causes” but was instead irrigation waste water. Id. at 481, 162 P.2d at 399; see also, Burnett Jr., 20
Idaho L. Rev. at 189 (“In Loosli v. Heseman, the Supreme Court expressly approved the ‘civil law’ rule. The court
held that an upper landowner had an easement 0f drainage across the land of a lower proprietor, t0 the extent 0f
water naturally ﬂowing from higher ground to the lower tract”). As such, the fact the lands included artiﬁcial 01‘
developed features (i.e. cultivated ﬁelds) did not preclude the natural servitude that existed for the ﬂow 0f surface
water.
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Like the farm in Smith, the fact the land in

this case

was developed

into a subdivision did

not “cut off” 0r sever the historic natural servitude between the upgradient lands (282 acres
including Roberts’ property) and the lower land

owned by the

Jensens. In this respect the district

court erred in concluding no natural servitude could exist because the subdivision

and the water from the culvert discharged into a
In sum, an artiﬁcial or

“man-made”

was developed

ditch. R. 707.

feature like a developed ﬁeld, road, culvert 0r ditch

does not “cut-off’ or preclude the existence of a natural servitude between two adj acent
properties. In this case Sunnyside Dn've,

its

culvert,

and the

ditch,

have

all

been

in place for

decades and have been subj ect t0 ﬂowing surface waters that entire time. The Jensens’ unilateral

changes to the property in 2013 unlawfully blocked and interfered with the natural servitude. As
such, the Jensens’ argument

on

this issue is plainly

erroneous and should be rejected.

A Natural Watercourse is Not Required for a Natural Servitude.

III.

The Jensens have apparently abandoned
a “natural watercourse”

(“One way

is

their prior

argument before the

a required element 0f a natural servitude.

to establish a natural servitude appears to

district court that

Compare Resp.

Br. at 16

be an adequate showing 0f a natural

watercourse.”) (emphasis added), with R. 447, 449-5 1 (alleging “without a stream there can be

n0 natural watercourse; and Without a natural watercourse, there can be no natural
(emphasis added). 16 However,

16

The

district court

matter 0f law there

at the

same time the Jensens confusingly

state “the

highlighted the errors in the Jensens’ argument below: “The defendants

.

.

.

servitude.”)

Waste Ditch

is

assert that as a

n0 ‘natural servitude’ because the water in question does not discharge into a natural water
course.
The defense also suggests that the surface water must naturally drain through a natural watercourse
however the issue of a natural watercourse is an ‘exception’ to the civil law rule.” R. 701, 705 (emphasis added).
.

.

is

.
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not – and was never – a natural watercourse and no natural servitude exists . . .” Resp. Br. at 12.
Despite these conflicting assertions, the Jensens continue to advance the argument on appeal that
since the ditch is not a “natural watercourse” it is therefore “antithetical to the character of a
natural servitude.” Resp. Br. at 16, 20.
Given the Jensens’ fluid position on this point, it is worth repeating that Idaho law does
not require a “natural watercourse” as an element of a natural servitude. See generally, App. Op.
Br. at 10, 13-15, see also, R. 705. Contrary to the Jensens’ argument, not every Idaho case that
has considered a natural servitude has turned upon the existence of a natural watercourse. See
Loosli, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393; Teeter, 19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8.
Further, the “civil law” rule simply provides that “[a]n owner of lower property must
accept the burden of surface water which naturally drains upon his land.” Smith, 105 Idaho at
646, 671 P.2d at 1109. There is no dispute that the Roberts property lies higher than the Jensen
property and that diffused surface water has always flowed from the Roberts property (and
upgradient lands) to and through the Jensen property. R. 41, 49, 65, 408, 410-11. Consequently,
the Jensens had no right to block the flow of surface water to the detriment of Roberts. See e.g.
Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 56, 704 P.2d 950, 960 (Ct. App. 1985) (“Certainly the Penrods
had no right to simply dam the community ditch and thus force the unwanted water to flow out
over the Merrill parcel.”).
The fact a “natural watercourse” is not present does not change the governing law
between the properties. The Court should reject any argument advanced by the Jensens
requesting that such a criteria be required for a natural servitude.
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The

IV.

District

The Jensens

Court Wrongly Dismissed Roberts’ Nuisance and Trespass Claims.

assert that Roberts’ nuisance

and trespass claims were properly dismissed

since she does not have a natural servitude. See Resp. Br. at 29. Yet, as set forth above, Roberts

has shown the necessary facts and applicable law to afﬁrm the natural servitude that burdens the

Jensen property.

As

to the nuisance claim, the Jensens completely overlook the sole basis for the district

court’s dismissal,

plainly

shows

which was

its

reliance

upon Idaho Code

that Roberts’ nuisance claim

was grounded

§

42-1207. R. 710. The record

in a natural servitude as well. R. 390.

Consequently, the court erred in dismissing the claim as a matter of law Without addressing the
facts relevant to the Jensens’ actions that interfered

district court

ignored the holding in Langley

1105-06 (1956). For

this

v.

with the natural servitude. Further, the

Deshazer, 78 Idaho 376, 378-80, 304 P.2d 1104,

reason the Court should reverse the

district court’s

wrongﬁJI dismissal

of Roberts’ nuisance claim.
Next, the Jensens allege that Roberts’ trespass claim

is

invalid because the excess water

did not originate from the Jensens’ property. See Resp. Br. at 31-32. The fact the Jensens’
actions caused the increased

ﬂooding on Roberts’ property

The Jensens ignore

and holding

the facts

in

Johnson

v.

is

sufﬁcient to raise a trespass claim.

Twin Falls Canal Ca, 66 Idaho 660, 664,

167 P.2d 834, 835 (1946) Where the subject water did not originate from the alleged trespasser’s

(Twin

17

Falls Canal Co.) property. 17

Whereas

as the water in the

Snake River ﬂowed by the

Like the Teeter case, the Jensens make absolutely no mention of or response t0 the facts and holding in Johnson.
their brieﬁng, they cannot escape the controlling precedent and

While the Jensens prefer t0 avoid adverse cases in
the effect 0f those decisions 0n the present appeal.
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appellant Johnson’s property, the downstream dam increased the water level on his land causing
erosion and damage upstream. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized the trespass caused by
increasing the water level on the appellant’s property even though the water did not come from
the canal company’s property. Johnson, 66 Idaho at 675-76. The facts here are similar as the
Jensens’ action to obstruct or “dam” the flow of surface water caused the water to back up onto
Roberts’ property in areas that previously never flooded (i.e. home, barn, corrals). R. 41
(“During those two previous events, the water never reached anywhere near the barn or corrals
on my property, and it certainly never reached the crawl space of my home.”).
The principal holding in Johnson follows what the Idaho Supreme Court has prohibited
in the context of navigable and non-navigable watercourses. See App. Op. Br. at 33. Although
the Jensens in filled a ditch, not a natural watercourse, the liability for the wrongful action should
be treated the same as they caused water to invade an adjoining landowner’s property without
justification. As such, the district court erroneously dismissed the trespass claim as a matter of
law. The Court should reverse and remand the case accordingly.
V.

The Jensens’ Actions in 2013 and Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment
Pursuant to an “Act of God” Defense.
The Jensens argue the Court can alternatively affirm the dismissal of Roberts’ nuisance

and trespass claims as a matter of law pursuant to the “Act of God” defense. See Resp. Br. at 33.
While Idaho law allows an appellate court to make a such a finding, the alleged defense must
still be evaluated under the summary judgment standard. In other words, the Jensens carry the
burden to show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

20

judgment as a matter 0f law. See I.R.C.P.

56(a); City ofPocatello

v.

State ofldaho (In re

SRBA),

145 Idaho 497, 500, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2008).

There

is

n0 basis for

this

Court t0 ﬁnd an “Act 0f God” defense as a matter of law since

the Jensens’ actions of ﬁlling in the ditch Vitiate the defense. Alternatively, at a

minimum,

genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as t0 whether or not the defense

would apply
cases.

13

in this case.

See Harper

v.

Idaho courts recognize a

common law “Act 0f God”

defense in certain

Johannesen, 84 Idaho 278, 371 P.2d 842 (1962). However, the defense

requires the following elements:

The ‘Act of God’ defense

to negligence tort actions is

based on

this

premise that negligence cannot be predicated upon a failure to anticipate that

Which was s0 extraordinary and utterly unprecedented as to have eluded the
“The distinguishing characteristic of an ‘act of
foresight of a reasonable man.
God’ is that it proceeds from the force 0f nature alone, t0 the entire exclusion 0f
.

human
See Curtis

v.

.

agency.”

Dewey, 93 Idaho 847, 849, 475 P.2d 808, 810 (1970) (emphasis added).

The 2017 ﬂooding on

human

.

agency.”

As

referenced above, and admitted

2013, thus interjecting
historic drainage

the Roberts property did not result “to the entire exclusion of

“human agency”

by the

into the equation

Jensens, they ﬁlled in the ditch in

by changing the topography and

between the two properties. In other words, the change in topography on the

Jensen property caused additional ﬂooding on the Roberts property that would not have occurred
otherwise. Roberts submitted an expert report speciﬁcally analyzing the estimated ﬂooding and

how the change to the Jensen property affected the

18

Idaho Code

§

scope of ﬂooding on her property. R. 535-63.

42-1204 provides an “act 0f God” defense for canal operators.
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Dr. Brockway’s analysis found that not only did the ﬁll

ﬂooding of Roberts property
cause ﬂooding

shows

at

in

2017 (with a

much lower ﬂow

ﬂow

10W

rates (as

15 cfs), but that the ﬁll

at

at 0r

(“.

.

in the

would continue

as 2 cfs) in the future. R. 541 (“The

that the ﬁll creates a signiﬁcant increase in water level

modeled discharges”) (emphasis added); R. 540
water

0n the Jensen property result

model

on the Roberts property

.signiﬁcant ﬂooding

to

at_a11

would occur with

above 3587.0 feet”).

The following

table identiﬁes that

more frequent occurrence due

Table

t0 the ﬁll

Model

2.

Flow rate

Ms)

R. 541; see also, EX.

ﬂooding of structures on the Roberts property will be a

0n the Jensen property:

results.

Computed water surface elevation of
pom?

o-n

Roberts property

Increase
(fe.et)

(feet,

Exnstlng

Pre-flll

0.5

3536.90

3586.01

0.89

1

3586.98

3586.51

0.47

2

3587.07

3586.80

0.27

3

3587.14

3586.82

0.32

5

3587.24

3586.85

0.39

10

3587.40

3586.91

0.49

15

3587.49

3586.97

0.52

25

3587.61

3587.12

0.49

A to App.

0p. Br. (contour line showing

how ﬂooding above 3587

ft

impacts the Roberts property).
Further, the Jensens

wrongly allege

a matter 0f law, the result of an Act of God
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.”
.

.

of the damages claimed by Roberts, were as

Resp. Br. at 34. Whether the defense applies

is

22

not simply a “matter 0f 1aw.”19 With respect to the water involved in 2017, the district court

noted the “parties and experts have provided no information to the Court as t0 the amount 0f

snow accumulation and
rain and rapid

by the

rain that occurred in February,

snow

summary judgment.

grant

Instead,

court’s perceived lack of evidence

summary judgment must be denied

disputed issue 0f fact must proceed t0

Denying summary judgment
where

The

melt.” R. 702.

2017 and the amount of water generated
is

no basis

to

such a case and the

in

trial.

is

particularly relevant for an alleged

that question is submitted to a jury.”

See Curtis

“Act of God” defense

Dewey, 93 Idaho 847, 475 P.2d 808

v.

(1970) (Supreme Court reversing district court’s grant of motion for involuntary dismissal or a
directed verdict

on “Act of God” defense, noting the issue “should have been submitted

jury”); see also Harper,

84 Idaho

at

286, 371 P.2d at 847

(“It

was

to the

for the jury to determine

Whether the cause of the injury was that of an ‘Act 0f God’, or whether from the defendant’s
actions in failing to

comply with

also, Uniroyal, Inc.

v.

the obligations he

assumed by making such a change.”); see

Hood, 588 F.2d 454, 460 (5th

the jury to determine whether the facts of the case at

of the

19

[act

of God] defense. Speciﬁcally,

it is

Cir.

hand

.

.

.

Inc.

v.

then the responsibility 0f

fulﬁll the legal criteria for recognition

be an “act of God,”

that does not absolve those

McCormick Properties, Ina, 441 A.2d

1119, 1128-29 (Md.

was an ‘Act of God’ does not, of itself, serve t0 exonerate appellees from
man
collaborate in causing ﬂood damage, man must pay at least for his share of the
Where God and

App. 1982) (“the mere
liability.

Mark Downs,

(“It is

for the jury to determine, as a matter of fact,

Further, other courts have noted that even if an event is found to

contributing to the damage. See

1979)

fact that ‘David’

blame.”).
2°

Roberts did not request a jury

fact, the

Idaho

trial at

the outset 0f the case.

court cannot resolve disputed issues 0f fact at

1, 7,

However, even ifthe

trial

court

summary judgment. See Montgomery

is

the ultimate trier of

v.

Montgomery, 147

205 P.3d 650, 656 (2008).
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whether the casualty resulted from an irresistible and unforeseeable natural event to which
human agency did not contribute.”).
Finally, although federal and state disaster declarations were made in 2017, that fact
alone does not automatically prove that an “act of God” defense is applicable to the facts in this
case. A broad disaster declaration does not substitute or excuse the court’s duty to examine the
particular facts of this case. As such, the Court should decline the Jensens’ request to perform
the trial court’s role and should reject their argument accordingly. See Jones v. Runft, Leroy,
Coffin & Matthews, Chtd., 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994) (“In considering a
summary judgment motion, it is not the function of the trial court, or this Court, to weigh the
evidence.”); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 7, 205 P.3d 650, 656 (2008) (“trial court,
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve controverted
factual issues.”).
The factual “Act of God” defense is no basis for this Court to affirm summary judgment
in the alternative on appeal. Whether the defense applies is an issue for trial. The Court should
deny the Jensens’ request accordingly.
VI.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Excluding Relevant Expert Testimony.
The Jensens contend the district court properly excluded Dr. Brockway’s affidavits

because Roberts has no interest in their property and that the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. See Resp. Br. at 40-41. The court’s abuse of discretion cannot be
overlooked, particularly in cases like this where evidence concerning topography and hydrology
go to the crux of the natural servitude at issue.
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The

excluding Dr. Brockway’s expert testimony because

district court erred in

plainly relevant to Roberts’ natural servitude. Dr.

and surface water drainage 0f the
538-43.

area,

Brockway analyzed topography, hydrology,

both with and without the ﬁll placed by the Jensens. R.

How water ﬂowed between the two properties clearly goes to the issue of a natural

servitude.”

If the court

analysis provided

by

existed and that

was

it

Dr.

had properly analyzed the natural servitude question

Brockway would have shown

violated

by the

“When this Court reviews an
inquiry

was

it

is:

(1)

whether the

whether the

trial

trial

the trier 0f fact that such a servitude

Jensens.

alleged abuse 0f discretion

by a trial

its

court, the

sequence of

court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)

court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with

the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to

court reached

clear the

it is

decision

by the exercise of discretion.” Weeks

v.

it;

E.

and

(3)

whether the

Idaho Health

trial

Servs., 143

Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007).

While Roberts maintains
discretion proposed

that the district court did not act Within the outer

by Daubert or

bounds of

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the

exclusion of expert testimony, (App. 0p. Br. at 18-26), the Jensens only argument in response
addresses the exercise of reason. See Resp. Br. at 41. In addition to relying on the lower court’s

improper focus on culvert capacity
the Jensens attempt to insert their

21

Even

the Jensens’ counsel

had

-

Which

is

not a component of a natural servitude analysis

own “ﬁndings”

into the district court’s decision.

See

originally represented that: “[p]articular1y with reference to causation

.

id.

.

-

(“The

the

assistance of an expert will be necessary.” R. 109.
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district court

of the

found that Dr. Brockway was too willing to

ﬂow at issue before 2013

Dr. Brockway’s opinion

was

with conjecture.”);

speculative rests

ﬁll in his understanding

0f the situation

at 41, n. 5 (“. .the district court’s

0n the

.

fact that

point that

he analyzed the situation

after the

Jensens ﬁlled in the Waste Ditch, but only provided speculation regarding the situation before
that action”). Notably, the district court neither

made

these ﬁndings nor provided such

analogous analysis. R. 702-703. As such the Court should ignore these assertions.
Further, contrary to the Jensens’ characterization, Tables 2 and 3

Brockway’s report scientiﬁcally compares the pre and post-2013

and Figure 3 of Dr.

ﬁll condition

of the Jensen

property and the resulting impacts on the Roberts property.” R. 541-543. The district court’s
dismissal of the expert testimony hinged solely on the lack of analysis regarding the capacity of

the culvert to

convey water. R. 703. Again, contrary

to the district court’s rationale, the exact

amount of increased ﬂooding caused by the Jensens’ actions was not

dispositive for the purposes

of granting judgment as a matter of law. Further, that issue does not defeat the existence of a
natural servitude or Roberts’ requested injunctive relief, but instead raises a disputed issue of

material fact that

would have

to

be determined

at trial.
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The Jensens claim that expert “circumstantial evidence” testimony related to the Roberts property ﬂooding in
2017 is “speculative” and was properly excluded. However, Dr. Brockway applied a proper assumption related to
the culvert capacity (50%) and estimated the impacts 0f increased ﬂooding caused by the Jensens’ actions. R. 539,
541. If such evidence of causation requires “knowledge 0f a situation before and after the posited event,” several
witnesses provided relevant evidence about how water ﬂowed t0 and through the Jensen property prior to 2013. R.
41, 49, 65, 408. Accordingly, the Jensens’ standard, if it applies, was met. In sum, since there were outstanding
issues of fact the evidence should not have been excluded and summary judgment should have been denied. See
Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179, 731 P.2d 171, 174 (1986); see also, Fullerton v. Griswold, 142
Idaho 820, 823, 136 P3d 291, 294 (2006) (trial court can only make inferences on “undisputed evidence).
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Admissibility of evidence within depositions and afﬁdavits in support or in opposition to
a motion for

summary judgment

determine the outcome of the
81

1,

is

a threshold question to be addressed before a court can

summary judgment motion. See Bromley

979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999); Montgomery

(2007).

The

test for admissibility

v.

v.

Montgomery, 147 Idaho

0f expert testimony

is

Garey, 132 Idaho 807,

1,

Rule 702. See State

205 P.3d 650
Merwz'n, 131

v.

Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998).

There

is

no dispute

that Dr.

Brockway

is

qualiﬁed as an expert in

civil

and environmental

engineering. R. 52. Dr. Brockway’s analysis incorporated scientiﬁc methodology to assess the

topographical and hydrological components of drainage from the Roberts property to the Jensen

property both before and after the Jensens ﬁlled the ditch. R. 538—543. The resulting expert

testimony and analysis speaks directly to the surface water

ﬂow which will

assist the trier

ﬂow and the

effects

of changing that

of fact in determining the causes of the ﬂooding in 2017. R. 542.

The doctrine of natural servitude does not require a

certain rate of ﬂow be present before

a lower landowner must accept naturally draining water, but instead focuses

simply requiring that the lower landowner accept

it.

its

mandate on

Thus, the amount 0f water capable of

passing through the connecting culvert was not a controlling question.” Instead the question was

Whether a natural servitude existed and whether the Jensens’ actions were contrary to
responsibility under that burden.

natural servitude before

23

it,

Had the

the court

district court

properly addressed the question of the

would have recognized Dr. Brockway’s

Moreover, the culvert capacity was irrelevant to the

fact that

their

water historically

ﬂowed to

analysis as highly

the Jensen property both

through the culvert and over Sunnyside Drive. R. 41, 49, 65, 408.
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relevant and directly on point. At a minimum the evidence presented created a disputed issue of
material fat that could not be decided on summary judgment.
As such, the district court did not reach its decision to exclude Dr. Brockway’s testimony
by an exercise of reason, therefore its decision should be reversed as an abuse of discretion.
A.

The District Court’s Exclusion of Dr. Brockway’s Expert Testimony was Not
Harmless Error.

The Jensens argue that even if the district court abused its discretion in excluding the
expert testimony, such error is harmless because the testimony was immaterial. The Jensens
appear to hinge this theory on the basis that Dr. Brockway’s analysis addressed the causation of
the backup of surface water on the Roberts property without analyzing culvert capacity. Resp.
Br. at 39. Again, as discussed above and in Roberts’ Opening Brief, such analysis is fatally
flawed and does not justify the district court’s decision on this issue. See App. Op. Br. at 22-27.
Dr. Brockway’s testimony can be grouped into two main categories which are both
relevant to the existence of a natural servitude. First, the testimony offers evidence regarding the
direction of flow from Roberts’ higher property to Jensens’ lower property (pertinent to the
existence of a natural servitude). Second, the testimony offers analysis of that flow before and
after the Jensens filled in the ditch in 2013, thus elevating the gradient of their land, including at
the point where water would flow onto it (pertinent to the existence and unlawful interference
with the natural servitude). R. 156, 173 (photograph showing fill of dirt, rocks, etc. blocking the
culvert on the Jensen property), R. 695.
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The key concern
trier

of fact in drawing

F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th

in admitting expert testimony is

its

own

conclusion as to a “fact in issue.” See United States

Cir. 1993).

servitude existed across the

whether the testimony will

The question before

the district court

assist the

v.

Rahm, 993

was whether a natural

low point of the Jensens’ property where surface water had naturally

drained for decades. R. 41, 49, 65, 408. Both categories 0f Dr. Brockway’s analysis are directly
material to those facts in issue. Excluding such evidence

summary dismissal of Roberts’

not “harmless”

harmed Roberts and her

v.

it

a

results in a

trial

on the

rights.

by relying upon

further support their “harmless error” claim

statements in City ofBellevue

when

By preventing Roberts from proceeding to

case.

merits, the district court’s error clearly

The Jensens

is

isolated

Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1036 (1908). However, the Jensens

overlook pertinent sections of the Court’s statements on this point:
[E]Very person shall so use and enjoy his own property, however
absolute and unqualiﬁed his title, that his use 0f it shall not be
iniurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to

the enioyment 0f their property, nor injurious t0 the rights 0f the

public,”

It

may be

if while

man
own property, and

stated as a general proposition that every

has a right t0 the natural use and enjoyment 0f his

lawfully in such use and eniovment, Without negligence or

malice 0n his part, an unavoidable loss occurs t0 his neighbor,

‘damnum absque

injuria,’ for the rightful

use 0f one's

it is

own land may

cause damage to another Without any legal wrong.
Daly, 94 P. at 1038 (emphasis added).
Clearly this passage does not stand for the proposition that unlawfully utilizing one’s land
to the injury

of another’s land Will be Without legal wrong.

only that a lower landowner

is
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It is

well-established in Idaho not

to accept the surface water

ﬂowing from

a higher
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landowner, but that interference with that servitude constitutes a legal wrong. See Lemhi County
v. Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 414 P.3d 226 (2018); Smith v. King Creek Grazing Ass’n., 105 Idaho
644, 646, 671 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Ct. App. 1983). Thus, the exclusion of Dr. Brockway’s
testimony which analyzed how water historically flowed from Roberts’ higher property through
the Jensens’ lower property, and the increased flooding that occurred after the Jensens filled in
the ditch within that servitude, was not harmless.
By improperly excluding the testimony of Dr. Brockway, the district court failed to
consider relevant evidence which not only created an issue of fact in contravention of summary
judgment, but also speaks directly to the questions of whether a natural servitude existed and
whether the Jensens violated that servitude. As such, Roberts respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Brockway’s testimony and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
VII.

Roberts Has Raised Reasonable and Legitimate Issues on Appeal, Therefore the
Jensens’ Request for Attorney Fees Should be Denied.
The Jensens seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, arguing that

Roberts has pursued this appeal “frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” See Resp.
Br. at 42. Yet the Jensens fail to elaborate how Roberts has pursued this appeal frivolously other
than to assert that “an upper landowner cannot have a natural servitude in an artificial ditch
crossing lower land.” Id. at 43. While the Jensens argue their position “is obvious,” the district
court made no such finding. R. 693-713. Notably, the district court denied the Jensens’ request
for fees below finding that Roberts had “presented good faith arguments.” R. 760.
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Further, contrary to the Jensens’ present request, Roberts has identiﬁed several cases

Where Idaho appellate courts have approved a natural servitude through
canal, a county road

and

Moulton. Based upon
t0

pursue

this

and developed ﬁelds. See supra, Teeter, Loosli, Smith,

culvert,

this precedent,

appeal.“

artiﬁcial features like a

Roberts has advanced reasonable and legitimate arguments

Stated another way, Where the district court did not address this existing

precedent in context 0f the facts 0f this case, Roberts had a good faith basis to request further
appellate review, particularly since the court summarily dismissed her claims. See

Bonz

v.

Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991) (“Motions for summary judgment
should be granted With caution

minds might reach

.

.

.

If the record contains conﬂicting inferences or reasonable

different conclusions, a

summary judgment must be denied”).

Roberts has raised legitimate legal errors 0n the part of the
the Jensens’ request for attorney fees

249 P.3d 829, 839-40 (201
judgment by

1)

district court, the

0n appeal. See Thomas

v.

(ﬁnding that when a lower court

or not the lower court's decision

is

ultimately overturned

-

Court should deny

Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 646-47,

errs in granting

failing t0 properly address all necessary elements

In addition, as

summary

0f the question before

an appeal upon such

is

it -

Whether

not frivolous 0r

without merit).

The Idaho Supreme Court has speciﬁcally acknowledged

that a case is not “frivolous” 0r

Without foundation Where the issues are “fairly debatable.” See Garner
468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (201

24

The

fact other jurisdictions

1).

Further, just because a district court

v.

Povey, 151 Idaho 462,

may dismiss

a claim as a

have not eliminated natural servitudes through artiﬁcial ditches further supports
41071 15 (Minn.Dist.Ct. July 24, 2008).

Roberts’ position 0n appeal. See Hylen v Kolbe, N0. CV-06-675, 2008
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matter of law does not mean it was “frivolous” either. See id. As set forth in Roberts’ Opening
Brief and this Reply, at a minimum Roberts has identified “fairly debatable” issues with respect
to the legal and factual bases for the district court’s decision.
That this case presents “fairly debatable issues” is magnified by Roberts being the sole
party that suffered actual damage in this matter. The Jensens gloss over this fact and the point
that it was their actions that created the dispute by causing additional flooding of Roberts’ home,
barn, and corrals in 2017. R. 42, 58, 60, 62. Since Idaho is not a “common enemy” state,
Roberts had no choice but to seek judicial recourse to protect her rights provided by the
governing “civil law” rule.
Finally, circumstances exist for an award of fees when an appellant has only asked the
appellate court to “second-guess” the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show
that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law. See City of Boise v. Ada
Cnty., 147 Idaho 794, 812, 215 P.3d 514, 532 (2009). Conversely, fees generally will not be
awarded when “the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of
law was presented.” Id.
Roberts has made good faith arguments on both the facts and the law in this case.
Roberts has requested this Court to properly apply existing precedent on natural servitude law
and remand the matter back for proceedings consistent with that decision. See Akers v. D.L.
White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 305, 127 P.3d 196, 208 (2005) (declining to award fees
on appeal where appellant raises valid issues necessitating remand to district court). Roberts is
not asking the Court to “second-guess” the district court on conflicting evidence. Rather, she is
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asking the Court to determine whether no material issue of fact existed to support summary
judgment for the Jensens, which partially resulted from the exclusion of relevant expert
testimony, and to determine whether the district court improperly applied the well-established
law of natural servitude. Moreover, Roberts has raised valid arguments concerning her nuisance
and trespass claims that were not properly addressed by the district court. See App. Op. Br. at
28-34. An appeal in such a case is legitimate and with foundation.
Based on the above, Roberts respectfully requests the Court deny the Jensens’ request for
attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Idaho’s natural servitude law provides certainty and justice for its citizens. Lower
landowners cannot interfere with but must accept the drainage of surface water from higher
ground. Moreover, a natural servitude can exist through artificial features such as a county road,
a culvert, developed fields, and in this case a ditch. Precedent going back over a hundred years
confirms this point. See supra, Teeter, Loosli, Smith, and Moulton.
As such, the Jensens did not have the right to fill in the ditch in 2013 and create a
condition that would damage or injure Roberts’ upgradient property. As a “civil rule” not a
“common enemy” law state, Idaho law forbids the Jensens from taking such actions, including
their hypothetical desire to “construct a crystalline wall” around their property. R. 433.
The district court misinterpreted well-established precedent and erred in summarily
dismissing Roberts claims to protect her property from flooding. Where surface water had
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naturally drained to and through the Jensen property for decades, the court erroneously ignored
this fact as well as the consequences of the actions taken by the Jensens in 2013.
Further, in reaching its decision on summary judgment the district court abused its
discretion by excluding relevant expert testimony analyzing the issues in this case. Whereas Dr.
Brockway provided relevant scientific evidence concerning hydrology, drainage, and the impacts
of the Jensens’ actions in filling in the ditch, the court had no rational basis to exclude such
testimony. The court’s error was not immaterial or harmless but had profound impacts as it was
used to justify the court’s decision on summary judgment.
Finally, the district court erred in dismissing Roberts’ nuisance and trespass claims as a
matter of law. Roberts’ nuisance claim was properly grounded on a natural servitude claim, not
just a statutory easement theory. The court completely overlooked this basis in its ruling.
Further, the court erred in dismissing Robert’s trespass claim as prior precedent (Johnson) did
not require the water to originate on the Jensen property in order for a trespass claim to go
forward.
In sum, for the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Roberts respectfully
requests this Court to reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with Idaho law.
DATED this 17th day of July, 2019.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
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Attorneys for Appellant Lora K. Roberts
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